Middle Class Liberation
Mukthir Gaan succeeds as an affectionate portrait of the travelling musicians in war-torn Bangladesh. The subtext that is not explored in the film but is nevertheless clearly present on screen, are the class differences among the Bengali refugees and freedom fighters. The troupe members are, for the most part, from middle-class backgrounds. Yet, here in the course of the film, they mix with village refugees, farmers and foot soldiers. There is some awkwardness in these interactions, as when the troupe embraces a group of soldiers at a liberated zone. In these few moments, one of the fundamental contradictions of the war effort is visible on screen.
The Awami League's anti-Pakistan posturing was the expression of a nascent middle class frustrated in the face of competition for resources with the Punjabi- and Urdu-speaking middle class. But when the war broke out, the conflict mutated into Bengali vs non-Bengali—class differences were temporarily forgotten as peasants fled across the border in the same cattle-carts as their city-bred "betters".

Throughout the nine months of conflict, the middle class leadership repeatedly declared the struggle to be for the "Workers and Farmers of Bengal". But as soon as the war effort was over, each faction retreatedto its own camp. With a nation of their own, the Bengali middle class prospered, the peasantry who returned across the borders of "free" Bengal found their status unchanged.
Most of the cultural troupe members are now well-placed members of Bangladesh society, but a search for some of the peasants seen on screen would probably place them in the same straw huts they lived in before the war. Not surprisingly, conspicuously absent in the New York screenings of Mukthir (attended by this writer) were the city's large Bangladeshi working class population. Ritual celebration of the war remains a middle class phenomenon—the only class that was truly "liberated" in 1971.
Too Much Authenticity
The challenge faced by the Masuds in putting the film together paled in comparison to the difficulties they confronted in attempting to release the film in Bangladesh. Inevitably, the film ran into the inter-party conflict that characterises the Bengali political establishment's approach to the history of independence.
Narratives glorifying the liberation war have traditionally helped the Awami League, whose strongest nostalgic connection to the voting population is through its role as leader of the liberation struggle. The League's traditional nemesis, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), attempts to weaken the AL's hold on "pro-liberation" sentiment by emphasising their founder Gen Ziaur Rahman's links to the struggle. A long-running and often raucous debate—played out in newspapers, speeches and parliament—focuses on Zia's famous declaration of independence on Chittagong Radio. In symbolism-obsessed Bangladesh, Zia's radio announcement is brandished as proof that he first declared independence, although the AL repeatedly points out that the announcement was made in Sheikh Mujib's name.
Mukthir Gaan stepped into this charged battlefield and ran immediately into the BNP government-controlled censor board. With its footage of Mujib's speech, and shots of soldiers yelling his name, the film was blocked as a partisan and doctored version of history. The sequence with a radio playing Zia's speech soothed the BNP stalwarts, but here the film ran into the unique problem of being too authentic. In recent years, the BNP had started publicising a staged version of the speech with the reference to Mujib cut out. But here was the original tape, recovered in Germany from a former employee of war-era Free Bengal Radio, with the reference to Sheikh Mujib as "great national leader" intact.
In the end, several factors worked in favour of the film. In 1995, the BNP government was engulfed by street protests as part of a two-year opposition campaign demanding neutral elections. Facing diplomatic and military pressure to yield to the election demands, the government seemed to have lost appetite for a showdown over Mukthir Gaan. Newspapers such as the popular Bhorer Kagoj played a key role by running feature stories with stills from the film. The Censor Board clearly recognised that newspaper reports were building growing public awareness of a film that was being called a "masterpiece", but facing suppression from the Board.
A Bengali writer, who assisted with the film, is of the opinion that the presence of an American, Catherine Masud, served as a powerful deterrent to the scissor-wallahs. This was no local production from struggling artists—the Masuds were well connected in New York, and there was no doubt that Catherine Masud would mobilise international opinion if the film did get banned. Already smarting from the Taslima Nasrin debacle in 1994, where the BNP had seriously underestimated the scope of international attention, the government was anxious to avoid another confrontation. In the end, the film received the long-awaited screening certificate with no visible compromise from the filmmakers.
As feared by the government, the film became a massive propaganda windfall for the Awami League. Mukthir Gaan was shown to wildly enthusiastic and overflowing crowds all over the country. Screenings were preceded by throngs of young men yelling "Joi Bangla". Showings at the army cantonment theatre, Garrison, were attended by the Army Chief General Abu Saleh Md. Nasim (who was later fired on charges of trying to engineer a pro-Awami League coup) and enthusiastic jawans. The Awami League, quick to recognise the huge publicity value the film had for them, distributed the soundtrack to campaign offices. Begum Zia's government made a half-hearted attempt to ban the film, starting with the Intelligence Forces' attempt to withhold issues of Bhorer Kagoj carrying in-depth coverage of the film. By then, however, public awareness of the film was too high for them to proceed further.
Revisionist History
Beyond the artistic value of Mukthir Gaan, the release of the film is a landmark event in a country struggling to build a coherent version of its history. Over the last two decades, every government has suppressed discussion on the liberation war to protect its own vested interests—sometimes the civil servants who stayed in their posts through the war, sometimes army officers who feared that glamorising the war would help the Awami League, and sometimes the Islamists of Jamaat-e-Islami who had actively helped the Pakistan army in 1971 by forming militia and death squads.
Now, following on the footsteps of Mukthir Gaan and Channel 4 (UK)'s celebrated War Crimes Trial documentary, there is a renewed interest in documenting the liberation war. This upsurge coincides with the Awami League's recent election victory—its first time in power since Mujib's 1975 assassination. Suddenly, there is a rush to prove oneself a die-hard Mujib-ist. You may expect a flood of documentaries and books on the late leader to follow.
Certainly, a history of Bangladesh's liberation needs to include the Awami League's and Sheikh Mujib's role in the struggle. But in the midst of all the fanfare, will anyone raise the uncomfortable questions about the inherent contradictions of a war fought with peasant cannon-fodder, yet led by the bourgeoisie-dominated Awami League; about the deep-rooted distrust between the leftist guerrillas and pro-Mujib factions; the tacit understanding between Indira Gandhi and the AL about the need to destroy the Naxalite-influenced Sharbahara Party; and the subsequent persecution of Jasad (Jathiyobadi Shamajthanthrik Dal, or the National Socialist Party) and other left forces which represented the only opposition at that time to the post-1971 Mujib government?
Without an analysis of all sides of a remarkably fluid struggle, a renewed interest in the history of Bangladesh's independence may not be substantially different from the propaganda exercises of the past.